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COMMENT
By JOHN G. WELLES

P

ROFESSOR Baram's paper has made a real contribution to my
thinking by providing a very helpful framework to work within. The
matrix he has developed also suggests an excellent classroom project
which we, as teachers, could use to foster enlightened student thinking
about the social control of science and technology. An assignment could
be given which would require the students to develop a similar matrix
on their own with further analysis leading to the development of other
useful analytical tools.
My general objection to the paper is that it seemed to place a little
too much emphasis on the negative social response - the remedial response - to science and technology without considering that there are
also many ways in which society can act affirmatively. The pollution
problem provides an example. We might attempt to solve this problem
by looking at the composition of the Gross National Product and
reducing those specific components of the G.N.P. which pollute the
environment. This would be a negative social response. However, I think
that it is important to have a growing economy to provide the additional
money - tax income and private income - to clean up the environment.
Thus we can look to those components of the G.N.P. which produce
little pollution. By stimulating these selective components of the G.N.P.,
the social control of science and technology can be positively oriented,
and the growth of the economy would not be endangered.
The advocacy of such a position does not exclude the social control
of the source of pollution, of course, and this is adequately pointed out
in an interesting assessment of the environment developed by Herman
Daly, an economist at Louisiana State University.
Mr. Daly acknowledges the efficacy in Adam Smith's theory of the
invisible hand, where the self-interest of many producers works to the
general public good in the free market -or,
as we have it now, a
regulated market. But coupled with the action of the invisible hand, he
sees at work an invisible foot, kicking the environment, because in the
course of the invisible hand working, the producer simply makes use of
the air, water, and land to discharge his effluents. This foot needs to be
controlled because it will not control itself - conquering the foot may,
therefore, be seen as the crux of the whole control problem.
Now, looking specifically at Baram's paper I have several observations to make. In reviewing the controls presently being exercised by
society over science and technology, Professor Baram mentioned that
retroactivity is inherent in a legal system based on conflicts within the
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private sector of society. It is important to recognize that there are also
conflicts within the public sector (a good example is the conflict between
the Interior Department and the Federal Aviation Administration over
the location of a jet airport near the Florida Everglades) in which retroactivity plays as important a role as it does in the private sector.
Because retroactivity makes many of our control systems ineffective, it is doubly important that public interest groups survive. Their
function in bringing public pressure to bear on undesirable situations is
a concurrent function, though these groups, too, when forced to use the
legal system, are hampered by retroactivity. It would be a tragedy if the
Internal Revenue Service removed the tax exempt status of these groups
just because they are making trouble. In view of our discussion it is
imperative that they do make trouble.
Perhaps the most disturbing aspect of Professor Baram's paper is his
faith in long-range planners. He spoke of creating new administrative
bodies at the federal level to better control science and technology but
then seemed almost to contradict himself by quoting Hugh Folk as
saying that such experts would need extraordinary courage to perform
a proper assessment function, since their careers would still be rooted
in the same industrial-governmental milieu.
By concentrating control in a few agencies one asks for real trouble.
I would rather pay the price of inefficiency, duplication, and a certain
amount of bungling under our present pluralistic and confusing system
than to concentrate this control in the hands of a few who have a great
deal of self-interest in the decision process as well as a vested position
to preserve when they do make mistakes.
Professor Baram stated at an earlier point in his paper that, although agencies possess the financial and technical resources, and
sometimes the authority, to function as effective social controls, they
have, in general, failed to do so. There is an excellent example of such
a failure here in Colorado.
This incident concerns the Rocky Mountain Arsenal which, from
1942-1957, disposed of their waste in an open pit. In 1954, a farmer

nearby who was irrigating his sugar beets from his well had his crop
turn brown. The agricultural experts that he called in diagnosed the
trouble as being caused by the chemical 2-4-D. Eventually two secret
investigations traced the trouble to the open pit that was draining into
the ground water the farmer was using to irrigate his crops. In 1961,
the Army admitted the damage and paid the farmer for 3 years loss.
At this point the Army decided to get rid of this waste by drilling
a deep well. They went 12,000 feet underground, and in March 1962,
they started to force the liquid waste, under pressure, into the deep
well. Between April 1962, and December 1965, Denver experienced
710 minor earthquakes.
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In 1965, David Evans, at the Colorado School of Mines, investigated this phenomena and theorized that the liquid waste was lubricating a fault into which the deep well had been drilled and was allowing the crust of the earth to slip back and forth. In 1966, the Army
stopped using the well when a U.S. Geological Survey study indicated
agreement with Evans, while disavowing any connection between its
well and the earthquakes. This, I think, was an example of bureaucratic
bungling.
To avoid such mistakes in the future, Professor Baram suggests
that "[a]dministrative agencies must be reorganized sensibly in light of
national needs and available scientific and technological resources."
Agency reorganization may be far more desirable than politically
feasible. For instance, the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy is so
jealous of its power that I doubt whether it would allow the Atomic
Energy Commission to be reorganized, as has been proposed, so as to
effectuate a diminuation of its power; and Congress is both the judge
and jury on that decision.
As a further measure to improve agency performance Professor
Baram indicated that assessment of environmental damage under the
National Environmental Policy Act should be made public. There are
two sides to the issue of full disclosure, and I think it warrants further
discussion. There are about eight or nine of us here who attended a
meeting on technology assessment at Andover, New Hampshire, in
August 1969. Considerable discussion centered on whether technology
assessment reports should be made fully public because of some of the
very things that are mentioned in Professor Baram's paper: the fear of
reprisal by the agencies on some of their employees because the employees are going against the self-interest of the director of the agency
and the fear that published speculation will lead the public to believe
that the agency is not sure of itself.
However, the provision of the Environmental Policy Act, requiring
agencies to make assessments of environmental impact, may prove very
beneficial, apart from the full disclosure issue.
According to the Wall Street Journal of October 27, 1970, under
a headline reading, "New Federal Program May Strengthen Effort to
Guard Environment: Presidential Council, Recent Law Pressure Agencies to Protect Valued Areas," the Environmental Policy Act had been
cited, as of August 1, 1970, in 18 federal court cases, 16 of which were
against the government. This act is a very encouraging development and
may have a lot more impact than the drafters, or at least the people who
voted for the legislation, may have realized.
I do agree with Professor Baram's approach to the method of
professional education, in that problem-orientation forces learning,
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synthesis, and application onto the student. It is like the Harvard
Business School case method that has been in use for many years.
As a final thought, I would suggest that one additional social
control be added to Professor Baram's matrix- long-term corporate
self-interest.
Robert 0. Anderson, Chairman of the Board of Atlantic Richfield,
made a speech (reported by The Denver Post, Environmental Section,
November 1, 1970) to the Institute for International Education in New
York recently in which he said that in the automobile and petroleum
industries we have placed a great value on the kind of efficiency that
results in high speed and fast pick-up. He says we should have been, and
must now begin, placing a greater value on the efficient use of energy
forms in an attempt to reduce pollution- even if the result is to
decrease consumption.
I may be harboring a naive hope, and I do not believe that the
general industrialist is ready to make such a far-reaching statement, but
industrial statesmen do serve in times of crisis, and I am hopeful that
Robert 0. Anderson is just the beginning of a long list of industrialists
who realize that it will be to their ultimate advantage to protect the
environment.

